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Citizens Disunited: McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
ADAM LAMPARELLO*
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court invalidated
aggregate limits on individual contributions to political candidates and
committees.1 Despite the immediate public outcry, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
was constitutionally defensible, just like Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.2 It was partially motivated by a robust
interpretation of the First Amendment and driven by the desire to increase (not
limit) political speech. Indeed, the notion that Congress may limit the extent that
wealthy individuals can express political support for a candidate is troubling. The
wealthy, like everyone else, are entitled to the full enjoyment of the Constitution’s
express and penumbral guarantees. The problem is that everyone else—including
the poor and middle class—also have that right. As a practical matter, however, the
Constitution’s written and unwritten rights are alive for the wealthy, merely
evolving for the middle class, and on life support for the poor.
Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion makes it likely that money and
inequality will continue to plague our democratic processes. Roberts’ opinion was
based on a narrow definition of corruption (the quid pro quo) and failed to
adequately acknowledge the real threat to political equality: unequal access and
influence in governance. Using money as the proxy for justice is a recipe for
corruption. This recipe does just as much damage to democracy as an outright
bribe.
The answer to this problem is found in pragmatism, not in the Constitution’s
text. Indeed, there is no objectively correct answer to whether the First Amendment
prohibits limits on individual or aggregate campaign contributions. The
Constitution is simply silent on the issue. Thus, in cases like McCutcheon and
Citizens United, the Court should have taken a pragmatic approach that deferred to
Congress’s judgment and the existing regulatory scheme. Instead, the Court
substituted its own judgment, which was based on philosophical (not textual)
differences and was contrary to several of its recent precedents.3 Ultimately, when
combined with the Court’s holding in Citizens United, McCutcheon leads to an
inequality of the most undemocratic kind, where wealth leads to “special access
and influence”4 and the ballot box is merely a symbolic gesture for most.
I. THE FACTS
Plaintiff Shaun McCutcheon argued that the aggregate contribution limits in the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign

* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.
1
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
2
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
4
134 S. Ct. at 1472 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Reform Act of 1971,5 violated the First Amendment.6 In the 2011–2012 election
cycles, McCutcheon had already donated $33,088 to sixteen different federal
candidates.7 But, McCutcheon wanted to give more of his wealth to other
candidates and several Republican National Party committees. The conservative
plurality agreed and held that the aggregate limits on the amount of money that
individuals can donate to candidates, political action committees, and political
parties violated the First Amendment.8 Sadly, the plurality’s decision will ensure
that wealth is the Constitution’s new “citizen,” the most powerful form of political
expression, and the primary path to influence.
II. THE DECISION
In McCutcheon, the plurality stated that First Amendment rights are important
regardless of whether the individual is, “on the one hand, a ‘lone pamphleteer[] or
street corner orator[] in the Tom Paine mold,’ or is, on the other, someone who
spends ‘substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political ideas
through sophisticated’ means.”9 The Court’s decision diminished the power of the
street orator’s voice and elevated the influence of the wealthy.
According to the plurality, the aggregate limits impermissibly encroached upon
expressive activity by limiting the number of individual contributions that
individuals could make in an election cycle.10 The plurality disagreed with a
portion of Buckley v. Valeo for maintaining that limits on individual contributions
imposed a “lesser restraint on political speech because they ‘permit[ted] the
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but d[id] not in any
way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.’”11
However, in the eyes of the plurality, the restraints at issue in McCutcheon
actually infringed a donor’s ability to speak. Unlike Buckley, where the statutory

5

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) and (3) restrict the amount of money an individual may contribute to
a particular candidate or committee and sets an aggregate limit on the amount that may be
contributed to all candidates or committees.
6
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (3). For the 2013–2014
election cycle, § 441a(a)(1) and (3) set forth base limits of $2600 per election to a candidate
($5200 total for the primary and general elections), $32,400 per year to a national party
committee, $10,000 per year to a state or local party committee, and $5000 per year to a
political action committee. The aggregate limits were $48,600 to federal candidates, and
$74,600 to other political committees. Additionally, only $48,600 of the $74,600 may be
contributed to state or local party committees, and PAC’s. Thus, during each election cycle,
an individual may contribute no more than $123,200 to candidates and committees.
7
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 1448 (brackets in original) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat’l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)).
10
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
11
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
Conversely, the Buckley court found that limits on expenditures (the amount an individual
can spend overall) restricted “the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” 424 U.S. at
19. These limits would therefore be subject to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations
on core First Amendment rights of political expression.” Id. at 44–45.
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limits prevented large campaign contributions12 but left individuals “free to engage
in independent political expression,”13 the aggregate limits in McCutcheon
prohibited individuals “from fully contributing to the primary and general election
campaigns of ten or more candidates [based on the 2013-2014 limits].”14 In other
words, “[a]n aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an individual
may support through contributions is not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”15 In Chief
Justice Roberts’ view, “Government may no more restrict how many candidates or
causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it
may endorse.”16
III. THE IMPLICATIONS
A. The Real Threat Is Unequal Access and Influence
The Court has previously held that “corporate wealth can unfairly influence
elections.”17 The mere “potential for distorting the political process” has been
enough reason to restrict expenditures.18
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the majority explained that
“[w]e have not limited [the anticorruption] interest to the elimination of cash-forvotes exchanges.”19 Thus, Congress could “legitimately conclude that the
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence
in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.’”20 The McConnell majority stated, “[w]e have repeatedly sustained
legislation aimed at ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form’” but do not
correspond to the general public’s opinion.21
As Justice Stevens stated in Citizens United, “[a] democracy cannot function
effectively when its constituent members believe laws are being bought and
sold.”22 That compromises “the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”23
The Court changed course in McCutcheon. While acknowledging that the
government has a compelling interest in “preventing corruption or its
appearance,”24 the Court held that only quid pro quo corruption may be targeted.

12

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 28.
14
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438.
15
Id. at 1448 (emphasis in original).
16
Id.
17
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
18
Id. at 661.
19
540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003).
20
Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
21
540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
22
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 453 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
23
Id. at 438 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
134 S. Ct. at 1450.
13
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Thus, legislation aimed at reducing “actual quid pro quo arrangements”25 and the
“appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for
abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions”26 would
likely be constitutional.
But the Court rejected the notion that “[s]pending large sums of money in
connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the
exercise of an officeholder’s official duties”27 implicated quid pro quo corruption.
In addition, “the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner
‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties” is not a reason to
infer the presence or appearance of corruption.28 Chief Justice Roberts went
further, stating that “the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere
influence or access.”29 Instead, relying on language from Citizens United, the
plurality declared that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause
the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”30
In rejecting a broader, influence-driven definition of corruption, the plurality
acknowledged that the line separating quid pro quo corruption from general
influence may “seem vague at times,”31 but the First Amendment requires the
Court to “err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”32
And erring on the side of protecting speech was required here because, “once the
aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount.”33 The problem,
of course, is that the vast majority of Americans cannot make any contribution of
any amount.
Like Justice Stevens in Citizens United, Justice Breyer had a much different
view than the McCutcheon plurality. Breyer recognized that corruption extends far
beyond a quid pro quo arrangement. So did the Court’s precedent, which
recognized that “criminal laws forbidding ‘the giving and taking of bribes’ did not
adequately ‘deal with the reality or appearance of corruption.’”34 In fact, the Court
had “found constitutional a ban on direct contributions by corporations because of
the need to prevent corruption, properly ‘understood not only as quid pro quo
agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment.’”35 The
aggregate restrictions, therefore, reduce “a significant risk of corruption—
understood not as quid pro quo bribery, but as privileged access to and pernicious
influence upon elected representatives.”36

25

Id.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.
28
Id. at 1451 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).
29
Id. (emphasis added).
30
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
31
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451.
32
Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Id. at 1452 (emphasis in original).
34
Id. at 1469 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 27 (1976)) (discussing Congress’s attempts to stop both bribery and corruption in the
political process).
35
Id. at 1469 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003)).
36
Id.
26
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B. Favoritism and Influence Are Not the Necessary Evils of Our System37
The McCutcheon plurality was apparently unconcerned with the inequality that
will result from its decision. It rejected the notion that attempts to “level the
playing field,” or to “level electoral opportunities” are sufficient to justify limits on
the number of candidates to whom an individual may contribute.38
But Congress is not trying to level the playing field; Congress is trying to
maintain the integrity of our political system. The aggregate limits implicitly allow
a degree of inequality, but try to keep an obvious inequality gap from shattering the
entire system. By invalidating the aggregate limits, the Court seemed more
concerned with the individual who can “only” give $5200 to nine political
candidates, rather than the individual who can only give fifty dollars to one
candidate.39
As stated above, the Court was insistent that First Amendment rights are crucial
regardless of whether the speaker is using large amounts of money to express
political views or is vocally proclaiming his views from a street corner.40 The
protections of the First Amendment are essential, but those protections are not a
reason to give individuals like Donald Trump and corporations like Bain Capital a
constitutional right to give every member of their party $5200. To do so would
incentivize elected officials to pander primarily to the wealthy, particularly since
the average middle class family cannot donate much, if anything, to any candidate.
C. Individualism Is Consistent with the Pubic Good
The plurality deemed inapposite “generalized conception[s] of the public
good”41 and “the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which
collective speech matters”42 because the First Amendment protects individual, not
collective, freedoms.43 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the notion that government
may “restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others [as] wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”44 Regulations
of that nature impermissibly rely on a “legislative . . . determination that particular
speech is useful to the democratic process.”45

37

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“Favoritism and influence are not, as the Government’s theory suggests, avoidable in
representative politics.”).
38
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.
39
Id. at 1448–49.
40
Id. at 1448 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)).
41
Id. at 1449 (plurality opinion).
42
Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
43
Id. (“The whole point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals protection against
such [laws that restrict free speech]. The First Amendment does not protect the government,
even when the government purports to act through legislation reflecting ‘collective
speech.’”).
44
Id. at 1450 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
45
Id. at 1449.
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But Congress is not making value judgments, and the aggregate limits have
nothing to do with the utility of speech. Rather, the aggregate limits are about
money, undue influence, and the access that can be purchased.46 Furthermore,
contrary to the plurality’s rationale, restricting the amount of money that an
individual or corporation can give to a single candidate does not solve this problem.
The aggregate limits “do not prevent a person who has contributed to a candidate
from also contributing to multi candidate committees that support the candidate.”47
Without the aggregate limit of $74,600, a wealthy donor “can write a single check
to the Joint [Republican or Democratic] Party Committee in an amount of about
$1.2 million.”48 To be sure, an individual could donate a total of $3.6 million if he
or she donated the maximum amount to all of his or her party’s political candidates
in a two-year election cycle, “all to benefit his political party and its candidates.”49
The aggregate limits, therefore, are not about policing speech or prohibiting its
robust exercise. Limits are about fairness.
D. There’s a Time, Place, and Manner for Everything
The Court has repeatedly held that “[r]easonable time, place, or manner
restrictions are valid even though they directly limit oral or written expression.”50
Indeed, “restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.”51
The regulations in McCutcheon were not based strictly on time and place.
Instead, the limits were akin to other restrictions on speech that regulate when,
how, and where various political opinions may be expressed. Furthermore,
Congress’s aggregate limits on individual expenditures (like its regulation of
corporate expenditures on the eve of primary and general elections) are not
attempts to regulate content. Congress did not seek to ban speech. Rather, these
regulations balanced the right to express political preferences through the spending
of money with the potentially perverse effects that money can have on the political
process. Thus, by holding that “Government may not seek to limit the appearance
of mere influence or access,”52 the plurality failed to recognize a problem that
threatens to undermine the integrity of our electoral process.

46

Id. at 1470 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court in McConnell upheld these new
contribution restrictions for the very reason the plurality today discounts or ignores. Namely,
the Court found they thwarted a significant risk of corruption—understood not as quid pro
quo bribery, but as privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected
representatives.”).
47
Id. at 1476 (emphasis in original).
48
Id. at 1472.
49
Id. at 1473.
50
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984).
51
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
52
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (emphasis added).
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E. Where Have You Gone, Justice Stevens?
Instead, we hear former presidential candidate Mitt Romney declare that
“corporations are people, my friend.”53 Corporate personhood is a legal fiction.54
Nevertheless, corporations were treated like people in Citizens United55 when the
Court invalidated a separate set of campaign finance regulations.56 The majority,
led by Justice Kennedy, held that the law “silenc[ed] certain voices,” and thus
infringed “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information
to reach consensus.”57 The voices—and citizens—to which the Court referred,
however, were those of corporations, not ordinary citizens.
Ironically the Citizens United majority characterized its decision as one that
protected the UPS drivers who live in small-town America, stating that the FEC
regulations undercut an “essential mechanism of democracy.”58 In Justice
Kennedy’s view, “[t]he fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to
spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the
ultimate influence over elected officials.”59
The people should have the ultimate influence, but they do not. Corporations
speak for their shareholders and self interests, not for the people. Corporations
speak with money, as the National Rifle Association did when it shot down
legislation that sought to regulate gun ownership in the wake of the Sandy Hook
tragedy. Of course, there is nothing wrong with that—corporations, unions, and
lobbyists have a right to use money to express their views. But when money
becomes the proxy for influence, it corrupts the political system and justifies
regulatory limits like those that the McCutcheon plurality invalidated.
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United chastised the majority for overruling
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which recognized that corporations
have “special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.”60 Justice Stevens also
reminded the Court that “a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in
a political campaign for election to public office.”61

53

Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says ‘Corporations are People’, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-corporations-arepeople/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ38I_story.html.
54
E.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 315 (2010) (explaining that corporate personhood
“typically refers to the legal fiction that allows an entity to hold personhood separate from
the natural persons who are its shareholders or officers”).
55
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336–42 (2010).
56
Id. at 320–21 (Federal law prohibits “corporations and unions from using general treasury
funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection
with certain qualified federal elections.”). See also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (prohibiting
expenditures within sixty days of a general election).
57
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
60
494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990).
61
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787 n.26 (1978).
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In Stevens’ view, because “the distinction between corporate and human
speakers is significant,” Congress has “a compelling constitutional basis, if not also
a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.”62 By
prohibiting Congress from enacting legislation that would stop the majority’s
decision, the Court “threaten[ed] to undermine the integrity of elected institutions
across the Nation.”63
F. A Corporate or Constitutional Democracy?
The McCutcheon plurality summarized its view of the First Amendment—and
citizen participation in democracy—as follows,
The First Amendment “is designed and intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.”64
Thus, “the First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to participate in
the public debate through political expression and political association.”65
The Court’s decision in McCutcheon actually undermined public debate by
compromising the integrity of our democratic system. As Justice Breyer noted in
his dissent, the “justification for aggregate contribution restrictions is strongly
rooted in the need to assure political integrity and ultimately in the First
Amendment itself.”66 To be sure, “[t]he threat to that integrity posed by the risk of
special access and influence remains real.”67
Ultimately, the plurality’s decision did not facilitate a fairer political process.
Instead, it “substitute[d] judges’ understandings of how the political process works
for the understanding of Congress; [and so] fails to recognize the difference
between influence resting upon public opinion and influence bought by money
alone.”68 This difference is the biggest threat to our democracy—a concentration of
wealth that leads to influence by the few.
CONCLUSION
The wealthy are democracy’s darlings, the middle class are its stepchildren, and
the poor are its orphans. Corporate giants line the pockets of senatorial
candidates—and purchase influence—while average citizens walk into a polling

62

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 396.
64
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (quoting Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1481.
63
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station and cast a largely symbolic vote. Stated simply, money creates a soft
inequality by dominating the political process. Like the “soft bigotry of low
expectations,”69 the soft inequality embedded in our political system has created a
liberty gap between the prosperous and the poor. McCutcheon was an opportunity
to bridge this gap. Instead, the Court enshrined the status quo by holding that
Congress could only regulate against quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. In
so doing, McCutcheon ensures that many voices will remain silent.

69

Nick Gillespie, The Soft Bigotry of Low Expectations for State of the Union Addresses Has
Got to Stop, REASON.COM HIT & RUN BLOG (Jan. 29, 2014), http://reason.com/blog/2014/01
/29/the-soft-bigotry-of-low-expectations-for.

